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Abstract. For many years, theories of collaborative learning 
tended to focus on how individuals function in a group. More 
recently, the focus has shifted so that the group itself has become 
the unit of analysis. In terms of empirical research, the initial goal 
was to establish whether and under what circumstances 
collaborative learning was more effective than learning alone. 
Researchers controlled several independent variables (size of the 
group, composition of the group, nature of the task, 
communication media, and so on). However, these variables 
interacted with one another in a way that made it almost 
impossible to establish causal links between the conditions and the 
effects of collaboration. Hence, empirical studies have more 
recently started to focus less on establishing parameters for 
effective collaboration and more on trying to understand the role 
which such variables play in mediating interaction. In this chapter, 
we argue that this shift to a more process-oriented account 
requires new tools for analysing and modelling interactions. 
1. Introduction 
For many years, theories of collaborative learning tended to focus on how 
individuals function in a group. This reflected a position which was dominant 
both in cognitive psychology and in artificial intelligence in the 1970s and 
early 1980s, where cognition was seen as a product of individual information 
processors, and where the context of social interaction was seen more as a 
background for individual activity than as a focus of research in itself. More 
recently, the group itself has become the unit of analysis and the focus has 
shifted to more emergent, socially constructed, properties of the interaction.  
In terms of empirical research, the initial goal was to establish whether and 
under what circumstances collaborative learning was more effective than 
learning alone. Researchers controlled several independent variables (size of 
the group, composition of the group, nature of the task, communication media, 
and so on). However, these variables interacted with one another in a way that 
made it almost impossible to establish causal links between the conditions and 
the effects of collaboration. Hence, empirical studies have more recently 
started to focus less on establishing parameters for effective collaboration and 
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more on trying to understand the role which such variables play in mediating 
interaction. This shift to a more process-oriented account requires new tools 
for analysing and modelling interactions. 
This chapter presents some of the major developments over recent years in 
this field, in both theoretical and empirical terms, and then considers the 
implications of such changes for tools and methods with which to observe and 
analyse interactions between learners. In so doing, we have tried to address 
both the work done in psychology and in distributed artificial intelligence 
(DAI). However, we have to acknowledge that this chapter has a bias towards 
psychology — not only because it reflects the interests of the authors to a 
large extent, but also because DAI has focused more on cooperative problem 
solving than on collaborative learning. 
At this point we need to make a brief comment on this distinction: learning 
versus problem solving and collaboration versus cooperation. While 
psychologists consider that learning and problem solving are similar 
processes, computer scientists still address them separately. Different research 
communities (DAI versus machine learning, for example) have developed 
different techniques, some for learning and some for problem solving. The 
'collaboration' versus 'cooperation' debate is more complex. Some people use 
these terms interchangeably. (Indeed, there is some disagreement amongst the 
authors themselves.) For the purposes of this chapter, in acknowledgement of 
distinctions that others in the field have made, we stick to a restricted 
definition of the terms. “Collaboration" is distinguished from "cooperation" in 
that cooperative work "... is accomplished by the division of labor among 
participants, as an activity where each person is responsible for a portion of 
the problem solving...", whereas collaboration involves the "... mutual 
engagement of participants in a coordinated effort to solve the problem 
together." (Roschelle &  Teasley, in press).  
Defining collaboration by the non-distribution of labour does not avoid 
ambiguities. Miyake has shown that some spontaneous division of labour may 
occur in collaboration: "The person who has more to say about the current 
topic takes the task-doer's role, while the other becomes an observer, 
monitoring the situation. The observer can contribute by criticising and giving 
topic-divergent motions, which are not the primary roles of the task-doer." 
(Miyake, 1986; p. 174). O'Malley (1987) reported similar results with pairs 
attempting to understand the UNIX C-shell command interpreter. This 
distribution of roles depends on the nature of the task and may change 
frequently. For example, in computer-supported tasks, the participant who 
controls the mouse tends to be "executor", while the other is likely to be the 
"reflector" (Blaye, Light, Joiner, & Sheldon, 1991). Cooperation and 
collaboration do not differ in terms of whether or not the task is distributed, 
but by virtue of the way in which it is divided: in cooperation, the task is split 
(hierarchically) into independent subtasks; in collaboration, cognitive 
processes may be (heterarchically) divided into intertwined layers. In 
cooperation, coordination in only required when assembling partial results, 
while collaboration is "... a coordinated, synchronous activity that is the result 
of a continued attempt to construct and maintain a shared conception of a 
problem" (Roschelle &  Teasley, in press). 
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2. Theoretical Issues: the individual or the group as the unit 
What is the nature of the dyad in collaborative learning? It can be viewed as 
comprising two relatively independent cognitive systems which exchange 
messages. It can also be viewed as a single cognitive system with is own 
properties. These two different answers to the question serve to anchor the 
two ends of the theoretical axis. At one end, the unit of analysis is the 
individual. The goal for research is to understand how one cognitive system is 
transformed by messages received from another. At the other end of the axis, 
the unit of analysis is the group. The challenge is to understand how these 
cognitive systems merge to produce a shared understanding of the problem. 
Along this axis, between the ‘individual' and the 'group', we can find three 
different theoretical positions: socio-constructivist, socio-cultural and shared 
(or distributed) cognition approaches.  
In this chapter we talk about an ‘evolution’ along this axis because the social 
end has recently received more attention — maybe because it has been 
previously neglected. We do not mean to imply than one viewpoint is better 
than another: scientists need both pictures from microscopes and pictures 
from satellites. Moreover, for the sake of exposition, the approaches will be 
presented as more different than they actually are. Both Piaget and Vygotsky 
acknowledge the intertwined social and individual aspects of development 
(Butterworth, 1982). 
2.1. The socio-constructivist approach  
Although Piaget's theory focused mainly on individual aspects in cognitive 
development, it inspired a group of psychologists (the so-called “Genevan 
School”) who in the 1970s undertook a systematic empirical investigation of 
how social interaction affects individual cognitive development (cf. Doise & 
Mugny, 1984). These researchers borrowed from the Piagetian perspective its 
structural framework and the major concepts which were used to account for 
development: conflict and the coordination of points of view (centrations). 
This new approach described itself as a socio-constructivist approach: it 
enhanced the role of inter-actions with others rather than actions themselves. 
The main thesis of this approach is that "...it is above all through interacting 
with others, coordinating his/her approaches to reality with those of others, 
that the individual masters new approaches" (Doise, 1990, p.46). Individual 
cognitive development is seen as the result of a spiral of causality: a given 
level of individual development allows participation in certain social 
interactions which produce new individual states which, in turn, make 
possible more sophisticated social interaction, and so on. 
Despite this theoretical claim, which suggests a complex intertwining between 
the social and the individual plane, the experimental paradigm used by its 
proponents involved two supposedly "individual" phases (pre- and post-test), 
separated by an intervention session in which subjects worked either alone 
(control condition) or in pairs. Evidence showed that, under certain 
conditions, peer interaction produced superior performances on individual 
post-test than individual training (for reviews, see Doise & Mugny, 1984; 
Blaye, 1988). The studies which established this tradition of research involved 
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children in the age-range 5-7 years, and relied essentially on Piagetian 
conservation tasks. Where working in pairs facilitated subsequent individual 
performance, the mediating process was characterised as "socio-cognitive 
conflict", i.e. conflict between different answers based on different 
centrations, embodied socially in the differing perspectives of the two 
subjects. The social dimension of the situation was seen as providing the 
impetus towards or catalyst for resolving the conflict. Such resolution could 
be achieved by transcending the different centrations to arrive at a more 
advanced "decentred" solution. 
From this perspective, the question was asked: under which conditions might 
socio-cognitive conflict be induced? One answer was to pair children who 
were, from a Piagetian perspective, at different stages of cognitive 
development. However, it was emphasised that subsequent individual 
progress cannot be explained by one child simply modelling the other, more 
advanced, child. It has been repeatedly demonstrated that "two wrongs can 
make a right" (Glachan & Light, 1981). What is at stake here, then, is not 
imitation but a co-ordination of answers. Subjects at the same level of 
cognitive development but who enter the situation with different perspectives 
(due to spatial organisation, for instance) can also benefit from conflictual 
interactions (Mugny, Levy & Doise, 1978; Glachan & Light, 1982).  
Researchers in DAI report similar empirical results. Durfee et al (1989) 
showed that the performance of a network of problem solving agents is better 
when there is some inconsistency among the knowledge of each agent. Gasser 
(1991) pointed out the role of multiple representations and the need for 
mechanisms for reasoning among multiple representations (see Saitta, this 
volume). These findings concern the heterogeneity of a multi-agent system. 
Bird (1993) discriminates various forms of heterogeneity: when agents have 
different knowledge, use various knowledge representation schemes or use 
different reasoning mechanisms (induction, deduction, analogy, etc.). For 
Bird, heterogeneity is one of the three dimensions that define the design space 
for multi-agent systems. The other dimensions, distribution and autonomy, 
will be discussed later. 
The success of the concept of conflict in computer systems is not surprising. 
This logical concept can be modelled in terms of knowledge or beliefs and 
integrated in truth maintenance systems or dialogue models. However, the 
main proponents of socio-cultural theory now admit that their view has 
probably been too mechanistic (Perret-Clermont et al., 1991). Blaye's 
empirical studies (Blaye, 1988) have highlighted the limits of "socio-cognitive 
conflict" as "the" underlying causal mechanism of social facilitation of 
cognitive development. Disagreement in itself seems to be less important than 
the fact that it generates communication between peer members (Blaye, 1988; 
Gilly, 1989). Bearison et al. (1986) reported that non-verbal disagreement 
(manifested for instance by moving the object positioned by the partner) was 
not predictive of post-test gains.  
The role of verbalisation may be to make explicit mutual regulation processes 
and thereby contribute to the internalisation of these regulation mechanisms 
by each partner (Blaye, 1988). This interpretation leads us to the socio-
cultural theory discussed in the next section. 
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2.2. The socio-cultural approach 
The second major theoretical influence comes from Vygotsky (1962, 1978) 
and researchers from the socio-cultural perspective (Wertsch, 1979, 1985, 
1991; Rogoff, 1990). While the socio-cognitive approach focused on 
individual development in the context of social interaction, the socio-cultural 
approach focuses on the causal relationship between social interaction and 
individual cognitive change. The basic unit of analysis is social activity, from 
which individual mental functioning develops. Whereas a Piagetian approach 
sees social interaction as providing a catalyst for individual change, often 
dependent upon individual development, from a Vygotskian perspective, 
inter-psychological processes are themselves internalised by the individuals 
involved. Vygotsky argued that development appears on two planes: first on 
the inter-psychological, then on the intra-psychological. This is his “genetic 
law of cultural development”. Internalisation refers to the genetic link 
between the social and the inner planes. Social speech is used for interacting 
with others, inner speech is used to talk to ourselves, to reflect, to think. Inner 
speech serves the function of self-regulation. 
A simple computational model of internalisation has been developed by 
Dillenbourg and Self (1992). The system includes two agents able to argue 
with each other. The agent's reasoning is implemented as an argumentation 
with itself (inner speech). Each learner stores the conversations conducted 
during collaborative problem solving and re-instantiates elements from the 
dialogue for its own reasoning. The learner may for instance discard an 
argument that has been previously refuted by its partner in a similar context. 
The psychological reality is of course more complex, what takes place at the 
inter-psychological level is not merely copied to the intra-psychological, but 
involves an active transformation by the individual.  
The mechanism through which participation in joint problem solving may 
change the understanding of a problem is referred to as “appropriation” 
(Rogoff, 1991). Appropriation is the socially-oriented version of Piaget's 
biologically-originated concept of assimilation (Newman, Griffin and Cole, 
1989). It is a mutual process: each partner gives meaning to the other's actions 
according to his or her own conceptual framework. Let us consider two 
persons, A and B, who solve a problem jointly. A performs the first action. B 
does the next one. B's action indicates to A how B interpreted A's first action. 
Fox (1987) reported that humans modify the meaning of their action 
retrospectively, according to the actions of others that follow it. From a 
computational viewpoint, this mechanism of appropriation requires a high 
level of opportunism from agent-B, which must integrate agent-A's 
contribution, even if this action was not part of his plans. 
Like the previous approach, this theory also attaches significance to the 
degree of difference among co-learners. Vygotsky (1978) defined the “zone of 
proximal development” as “...the distance between the actual developmental 
level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential 
development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or 
in collaboration with more capable peers.” We will see that this concept is 
important to understand some empirical results. 
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Research in DAI does not directly refer to Vygotskian positions. This is 
somewhat surprising since the issue of regulation, which is central to the 
socio-cultural theory, is also a major issue in DAI. In computational terms, 
regulation is more often referred to as a an issue of 'control' or 'autonomy'. For 
Bird (1993), it constitutes the second dimension of the design space for multi-
agent systems. As in political structures, there exist centralised systems where 
control is achieved by a super-agent or a central data structure (e.g., 
blackboard architectures) and decentralised systems in which each agent has 
more autonomy. An agent is more autonomous if it executes local functions 
without interference with external operations (execution autonomy), if it 
chooses when and with whom it communicates (communication autonomy) 
and whether it self-organises into hierarchical, serial or parallel sub-processes 
(structural autonomy) (Bird, 1993).  
2.3. The shared cognition approach 
The concept of shared cognition is deeply intertwined with the 'situated 
cognition' theory (Suchman, 1987; Lave, 1988 — see also Mandl, this 
volume). For those researchers, the environment is an integral part of 
cognitive activity, and not merely a set of circumstances in which context-
independent cognitive processes are performed. The environment includes a 
physical context and a social context. Under the influence of sociologists and 
anthropologists, the focus is placed largely on the social context, i.e. not only 
the temporary group of collaborators, but the social communities in which 
these collaborators participate.  
This approach offers a new perspective on the socio-cognitive and the socio-
cultural approaches, and has recently led to certain revisions by erstwhile 
proponents of the earlier theories. Perret-Clermont et al. (1991), for example, 
question the experimental settings they had previously used for developing the 
socio-constructivist approach. They noticed that their subjects tried to 
converge toward the experimenter's expectations. The subjects' answers were 
influenced by the meaning they had inferred from their social relationship 
with the experimenter. Wertsch (1991) makes similar criticisms against work 
in the socio-cultural tradition: social interactions are studied as if they occur 
outside a social structure. Through language, we acquire a culture which is 
specific to a community. For instance, we switch grammar and vocabulary 
rapidly between an academic seminar room and the changing rooms of a 
sports centre. But overall, beyond a vocabulary and a grammar, we acquire a 
structure of social meanings and relationships (Resnick, 1991) that are 
fundamental for future social interactions.  
This approach challenges the methodology used in many experiments where 
the subjects perform post-tests individually, often in a laboratory setting. 
More fundamentally, this approach questions the theoretical bases on which 
the previous ones rely: "... research paradigms built on supposedly clear 
distinctions between what is social and what is cognitive will have an inherent 
weakness, because the causality of social and cognitive processes is, at the 
very least, circular and is perhaps even more complex" (Perret-Clermont, 
Perret and Bell, 1991, p. 50). Collaboration is viewed as the process of 
building and maintaining a shared conception of a problem (Roschelle &  
Teasley, in press). While the previous approaches were concerned with the 
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inter-individual plane, the shared cognition approach focuses on the social 
plane, where emergent conceptions are analysed as a group product. For 
instance, it has been observed that providing explanations leads to improve 
knowledge (Webb 1991). From the 'individualist' perspective, this can be 
explained through the self-explanation effect (Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann & 
Glaser, 1989). From a 'group' perspective, explanation is not something 
delivered by the explainer to the explainee. As we will see in section 5, it is 
instead constructed jointly by both partners trying to understand each other 
(Baker, 1991). 
The idea that a group forms a single cognitive system may appear too 
metaphorical to a psychologist. It does not surprise a computer scientist. 
While the natural scale for a psychological agent is a human being, the scale 
of a computational agent is purely arbitrary. The (vague) concept of agent is 
used to represent sometimes a single neurone, a functional unit (e.g., the 'edge 
detector' agent), an individual or even the world. The granularity of a 
distributed system, i.e., the size of each agent, is a designer's choice. It is a 
variable that the designer can tune to grasp phenomena that are invisible at 
another scale. It supports systems with different layers of agents with various 
scales, wherein one may compare communication among agents at level N 
and communication among agents at level N+1. Dillenbourg and Self (1992) 
built a system in which the same procedures are used for dialogue among 
agents and for each agent's individual reasoning. Hutchins (1991) reports a 
two-layer system wherein he can tune communication patterns among the 
units of an agent (modelled as a network) and the communications among 
agents. According to the respective strengths of intra-network and inter-
network links, he observes an increase or a decrease of the group confirmation 
bias which cannot be reduced to individuals’ contributions. Gasser (1991) 
insists on properties of multi-agent systems which "will not be derivable or 
representable solely on the basis of properties of their component agents" (p. 
112).  
3. Empirical Issues: effects, conditions and interactions 
Not surprisingly, the different theoretical orientations we have just outlined 
have tended to employ rather different research paradigms. Generally, socio-
cognitive experiments concerned two subjects of approximately the same age 
(or the same developmental level) while the Vygotskian setting involved 
adult-child pairs. Moreover, the Piagetian and Vygotskian paradigms used 
different collaborative tasks. We come back to these differences later. Other 
paradigms have been used independently of a particular theoretical 
framework, for instance the 'reciprocal teaching' paradigm (Palincsar and 
Brown, 1984; Palincsar, 1987; Riggio et al., 1991) in which one learner plays 
the teacher’s role for some of the time and then shift roles with the other 
learner. We can also distinguish empirical work according to the size of the 
groups involved (dyads versus larger groups) or ways in which mediating 
technologies are employed, as in computer-supported collaboration.  
There are also differences between the various approaches in terms of the 
research methods employed. In the socio-cognitive perspective, the 
methodology was to set up conditions hypothesised to facilitate learning and 
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to compare the outcomes of this intervention with some control group. With 
such methods, collaboration is treated as a black box; the focus is on 
outcomes. In contrast, research from a socio-cultural point of view tends to 
employ micro genetic analyses of the social interaction. The focus is on the 
processes involved in social interaction. This is partly because of the 
importance attached to the concept of mediation in socio-cultural theory. 
Evidence is sought from dialogue for symbols and concepts which mediate 
social activity and which can in turn be subsequently found to mediate 
individual activity. The shared cognition approach obviously also favours the 
second methodology.  
Despite their intertwining, we have attempted to disentangle the different 
research paradigms and theoretical approaches. In what follows we describe 
the ‘evolution’ of empirical research within three paradigms that differ with 
respect to the number and the type of variables that are taken into account.  
3.1 The "effect" paradigm 
Experiments conducted to answer the question “is collaborative learning more 
efficient than learning alone?” were fairly straightforward. The independent 
variable was 'collaborative work' versus 'work alone'. The choice of the 
dependent measures varied according to what the investigators meant by 
'more efficient'. The most frequent measure was the subject’s performance 
when solving alone the task they previously solved with somebody else. Some 
researchers decomposed this dependent variable into several other measures 
of performance, such as the improvement of monitoring and regulation skills 
(Brown & Palincsar, 1989; Blaye & Chambres, 1991) or a decrease in the 
confirmation bias. Within this paradigm, the precise analysis of effects is the 
only way to understand the mechanisms that make collaborative learning 
efficient. 
This kind of research let to a body of contradictory results, within which the 
positive outcomes largely dominate (Slavin, 1983; Webb, 1991). 
Nevertheless, negative results cannot always be discarded as the result of 
experimental errors or noise. Some negative effects are stable and well 
documented, for instance the fact that low achievers progressively become 
passive when collaborating with high achievers (Salomon and 
Globerson,1989; Mulryan, 1992). There is a simple way to understand the 
controversial effects observed with the first paradigm: collaboration is in itself 
neither efficient or inefficient. Collaboration works under some conditions, 
and it is the aim of research to determine the conditions under which 
collaborative learning is efficient. This brings us to the second paradigm. 
3.2 The "conditions" paradigm 
To determine the conditions under which collaborative learning is efficient, 
one has to vary these conditions systematically. While the first experimental 
approach (in very general terms) varies only in terms of the dependent 
measures, the second experimental approach varies along two dimensions, 
both dependent and independent variables. Numerous independent variables 
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have been studied. They concern the composition of the group, the features of 
the task, the context of collaboration and the medium available for 
communication. The composition of the group covers several other 
independent variables such as the number of members, their gender and the 
differences between participants. It is not possible here to give a complete 
overview of the findings concerning each of these variables. We will illustrate 
the work with three examples.  
3.2.1 Group heterogeneity 
Group heterogeneity is probably the most studied variable. Scholars have 
considered differences with respect to general intellectual development, social 
status or domain expertise. They have considered objective and subjective 
differences in expertise (whether the subjects are actually different or just 
believe themselves to be so). We restrict ourselves here to objective 
differences between the task knowledge of each subject, a parameter which is 
relevant for DAI. For the socio-constructivist, this difference provides the 
conditions for generating socio-cognitive conflict. For the socio-cultural 
approach, it provides conditions for internalisation. However, the nature of 
differences differs within each theoretical approach. Socio-cognitive theory 
refers to symmetrical pairs (i.e., symmetrical with respect to general 
intellectual or developmental level) where members have different 
viewpoints, whilst socio-cultural theory is concerned with asymmetric pairs 
where members have different levels of skill. Piaget (1965) argued that 
interaction with adults leads to asymmetrical power relations or social status, 
and that in such interactions adults or more capable children are likely to 
dominate. The pressure to conform in the presence of someone with higher 
perceived status is not likely, in this view, to lead to genuine cognitive 
change. Nonetheless, Rogoff (1990) notes that many studies from a Piagetian 
perspective have involved pairing, for example, conservers with non-
conservers. This is hardly pairing children of equal intellectual ability and is 
more consistent with the Vygotskian position. The point of difference between 
the two approaches then is not one of “equal” versus “unequal” pairs, but 
exactly what this equivalence entails. Researchers have attempted to 
determine the optimal degree of differences. If it is too small, it may fail to 
trigger interactions. If the difference is too large, there may be not interaction 
at all. For instance, in a classification task, Kuhn (1972) shown children 
solutions reflecting a difference of -1, 0 , +1 or +2 levels compared to their 
own solutions. He only observed significant improvement in the +1 condition. 
This notion of optimal difference also emerges in DAI where Gasser (1991) 
notes that agents need a common semantics even to decide that conflict exists! 
The 'zone of proximal development' defines an optimal difference in an 
indirect way, i.e. not as a difference between subjects A and B, but as a 
difference between how A performs alone and how A performs with B's 
assistance. 
Heterogeneity is also function of the size of the group. Empirical studies 
showed that pairs are more effective than larger groups, but heterogeneity is 
not the only factor that intervenes. Groups of three are less effective because 
they tend to be competitive, whilst pairs tend to be more cooperative 
(Trowbridge, 1987). However, differences between group sizes seem to 
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disappear when children are given the opportunity to interact with other in the 
class (Colbourn & Light, 1987). 
3.2.2 Individual prerequisites 
A second set of conditions defines some prerequisites to efficient 
collaboration. It seems that collaboration does not benefit an individual if he 
or she is below a certain developmental level. We consider here the absolute 
level of the individual, not his or her level relative to the other group 
members. According Piaget, for a conflictual interaction to give rise to 
progress, it must prompt individual cognitive restructuring. This implies that a 
resolution of conflict which would be exclusively based on social regulations 
(compliance from one partner for instance) would prevent interaction from 
being efficient. Piaget’s theory predicts that pre-operational children lack the 
ability to decentre from their own perspective and therefore benefit from 
collaborative work. Indeed, as others have noted (Tudge & Rogoff, 1989), 
Piagetian theory in this respect leads to something of a paradox. It is not clear 
whether social interaction leads to the decentration necessary to benefit from 
collaboration, or that decentration has to happen before genuine collaboration 
can take place. Other research suggests that developmental factors need to be 
taken into account in resolving this issue. Azmitia (1988) looked at pairs of 5 
year old with equivalent general abilities and found that when novices (with 
respect to the domain) were paired with experts on a model building task they 
improved significantly, whilst equal ability pairs did not. Azmitia argues that 
pre-schoolers may lack the skill to sustain discussions of alternative 
hypotheses.  
Vygotskian theory does not place the same sort of explicit developmental 
constraints on the ability to benefit from collaboration, but recent researchers 
(e.g., Wood et al., in press; Tomasello et al., 1993) have argued that certain 
skills in understanding other people’s mental states are required for this which 
may set developmental constraints on collaborative learning. With a simple 
task this may be achievable at around 4 years of age, since children at this age 
can understand that another may lack the knowledge necessary to perform an 
action (or misrepresent the situation) and they can predict the state of the 
other’s knowledge. However, with more complex tasks, which demand 
reasoning using that knowledge to predict the partner's actions on the basis of 
their belief and intentions may not be achievable until about 6 years. In order 
to achieve shared understanding in a collaborative activity, the child must also 
be able to coordinate all these representations and have sufficient skills to 
communicate with respect to them.  
Research on peer tutoring has identified some conditions which are also 
relevant to collaborative learning. The first condition is that the child-tutor 
must be skilled at the task. Radziszewska and Rogoff (reported in Rogoff, 
1990) found that training a 9 year old peer to the same level of performance as 
an adult on a planning task led to peer dyads performing as well as adult-child 
dyads and better than peer dyads in which neither partner had been trained. A 
second pre-requisite is the ability of the child to reflect upon his or her own 
performance with respect to the task. Thirdly, in order to tutor contingently 
(i.e., to monitor the effects of previous help on subsequent actions by the 
learner), the child has to be able to assess whether the learner’s action was 
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wrong with respect to the instructions or wrong with respect to the task, and 
then be able to produce the next tutorial action on the basis of both a 
representation of the previous instruction and an evaluation of the learner’s 
response to that instruction. Ellis and Rogoff (1982) found that 6 year old 
children were relatively unskilled at contingent instruction compared with 
adult tutors. Wood et al. (in press) found that 5 year old peer tutors were 
similarly unskilled relative to 7 year old tutors, and that 5 year olds tended to 
have difficulty inhibiting their own actions sufficiently to allow their “tutee” 
to learn the task. However, children at this age were better “collaborators” 
than 3 year old comparison dyads. 
3.2.3 Task features 
Tasks that have been typically used in collaborative learning from a 
Vygotskian perspective include skill acquisition, joint planning, categorisation 
and memory tasks. In contrast, the implication from socio-cognitive theory is 
that tasks should promote differences in perspectives or solutions. Typically, 
conservation and coordination tasks involve perspective-taking, planning and 
problem solving. There is thus little overlap in the nature of tasks investigated 
from the Piagetian and Vygotskian perspective. It is also clear that the nature 
of the task influences the results: one cannot observe conceptual change if the 
task is purely procedural and does not involve much understanding; 
reciprocally one cannot observe an improvement of regulation skills if the 
task requires no planning. Some tasks are less “shareable” than others. For 
instance, solving anagrams can hardly be done collaboratively because it 
involves perceptual processes which are not easy to verbalise (if they are open 
to introspection at all). In contrast, some tasks are inherently distributed, 
either geographically (e.g., two radar-agents, receiving different data about 
the same aeroplane), functionally (e.g., the pilot and the air traffic controller) 
or temporally (e.g., the take-off agent and the landing-agent) (Durfee et al., 
1989). 
3.2.5 Interactions between variables 
Researchers rapidly discovered that the independent variables we have 
described so far do not have simple effects on learning outcomes but interact 
with each other in a complex way. Let us for instance examine the interaction 
between the composition of the pair and the task features. Studies that have 
compared the relative benefits of interacting with adults versus interacting 
with peers suggest that they vary according to the nature of the task, with 
peers being more useful than adults in tasks which require discussion of 
issues. Adult-child interaction may be more controlled by the adult rather than 
being a reciprocal relationship. Children are more likely to justify their 
assertions with peers than with adults. Rogoff (1990) notes that the 
differences between socio-cognitive and socio-cultural approaches with 
respect to composition of dyads are reconcilable. As she points out, whilst 
Vygotsky focused on acquiring understanding and skills, Piaget emphasised 
changes in perspectives or restructuring of concepts. Tutoring or guidance 
may be necessary for the former, whilst collaboration between peers of 
equivalent intellectual ability may be better in fostering the latter (Damon, 
1984). So, how dyads or groups should be composed with respect to skills and 
abilities may depend upon what learning outcomes one is interested in (e.g., 
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skill acquisition vs. conceptual change) and what tasks are involved (e.g., 
acquiring new knowledge versus restructuring existing knowledge).  
Although few studies have involved a direct comparison of peer collaboration 
and peer tutoring with the same task, the type of task may interact with the 
developmental level of the learner and the nature of the dyad. For example, 
Rogoff (1990) argues that planning tasks may be difficult for very young 
children because they require reference to things which are not in the “here-
and-now”. However, adults may be able to carry out such metacognitive or 
metamnemonic roles that are beyond children, whilst demonstrating to the 
child how such processing could be accomplished. So, certain types of task 
may have inherent processing constraints which in turn place constraints on 
how the interaction should be supported. 
3.3 The "interactions" paradigm 
The complexity of the findings collected in the second paradigm led to the 
emergence of a third one. This introduces intermediate variables that describe 
the interactions that occur during collaboration. The question "under which 
conditions is collaborative learning efficient?" is split into two (hopefully 
simpler) sub-questions: which interactions occur under which conditions and 
what effects do these interactions have. The key is to find relevant 
intermediate variables, i.e., variables that describe the interactions and that 
can be empirically and theoretically related to the conditions of learning and 
to learning outcomes. This methodology however raises interpretation 
difficulties: if some types of interactions are positively correlated with task 
achievement, it may be that such interactions influence achievement or, 
conversely that high achievers are the only subjects able to engage these type 
of interaction (Webb, 1991). Nevertheless, underlying this approach is a 
fundamental shift: it may be time to stop looking for general effects of 
collaboration (e.g., in global developmental terms) and focus instead on more 
specific effects, paying attention to the more microgenetic features of the 
interaction. We will illustrate this viewpoint by two examples that are 
important both in psychology and in DAI: explanation and control. 
3.3.1 Explanation 
One way of describing interactions is to assess how elaborated is the help 
provided by one learner to the other. This level of elaboration can be 
considered as a continuum which goes from just giving the right answer to 
providing a detailed explanation. Webb (1991) performed a meta-analysis of 
the research conducted on this issue. This synthesis lead to two interesting 
results: elaborated explanations are not related to the explainee's performance, 
but they are positively correlated with the explainer's performance. Webb 
explains the first result by the fact that learning from receiving explanations is 
submitted to several conditions which may not be watched by the explainer, 
e.g., the fact the information must be delivered when the peer needs it, that the 
peer must understand it and must have the opportunity to us to solve the 
problem. The second result, the explainer's benefit, has been observed by 
other scholars (Bargh and Schul, 1980). Similar effects (called the self-
explanation effect) have been observed when a learner is forced to explain an 
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example to himself (Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann & Glaser, 1989). A 
computational model of the self-explanation process have been proposed by 
VanLehn & Jones (1993). The main principle is that the instantiation of 
general knowledge with particular instances creates more specific knowledge, 
a mechanism that has also been studied in machine learning under the label 
'explanation-based learning' (Mitchell et al., 1986). It would nevertheless be a 
mistake to consider self-explanation and explanation to somebody else as 
identical mechanisms. This would dramatically underestimate the role that the 
receiver plays in the elaboration of the explanation. As we will see in section 
5, an explanation is not a message simply delivered by one peer to the other, 
but the result of joint attempts to understand each other. Webb (1991) found 
that non-elaborated help (e.g., providing the answer) is not correlated with the 
explainer's performance and is negatively correlated with the explainee's 
performance in the case where the explainee actually asked for a more 
elaborated explanation. Webb explains these results by the fact that providing 
the answer while the student is expecting an explanation does not help him or 
her to understand the strategy, and may lead the explainee to infer an incorrect 
strategy or to lose his or her motivation to understand the strategy. 
These findings partially answer the second sub-question of this paradigm, the 
relationship between categories of interaction and learning outcomes. The first 
sub-question concerns the conditions in which each category of interaction is 
more likely to occur. Webb (1991) reviewed several independent variables 
concerning group composition, namely, the gender of group members, their 
degree of introversion or extraversion and their absolute or relative expertise. 
With respect to the latter, explanations are more frequent when the group is 
moderately heterogeneous (high ability and medium ability students or 
medium ability and low ability students) and when the group is 
homogeneously composed of medium ability students. Some other group 
compositions are detrimental to the quality of explanations: homogeneous 
high ability students (because they assume they all know how to solve the 
problem), homogeneous low ability groups (because nobody can help) and 
heterogeneous groups comprising high, medium and low ability (because 
medium ability students seem to be almost excluded from interactions). 
Verba and Winnykamen (1992) studied the relationship between categories of 
interactions and two independent variables: the general level of ability and the 
specific level of expertise. In pairs where the high ability child was the 
domain expert and the low ability child the novice, the interaction was 
characterised by tutoring or guidance from the high ability child. In pairs 
where the high ability child was the novice and the low ability child the 
expert, the interaction involved more collaboration and joint construction. 
3.3.2 Control 
Rogoff (1990, 1991) conducted various experiments in which children solved 
a spatial planning task with adults or with more skilled peers. She measured 
the performance of children in a post-test performed without help. Overall she 
found better results with adult-child than with child-child pairs but, more 
interestingly, she identified an intermediate variable which explains these 
variations. Effective adults involved the child in an explicit decision making 
process, while skilled peers tended to dominate the decision making. This was 
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confirmed by the children who collaborated with an adult; those who scored 
better in the post-test were those for which the adults made the problem 
solving strategy explicit. These results are slightly biased by the fact that the 
proposed task (planning) is typically a task in which metaknowledge plays the 
central role. A socio-cultural interpretation would be that the explication of 
the problem solving strategy provides the opportunity to observe and 
potentially internalise the partner's strategy. From a socially shared cognition 
viewpoint, one could say that making the strategy explicit is the only way to 
participate in each other's strategy and progressively establish a joint strategy.  
4 Tools for observing interactions 
When collaboration is mediated via a computer system, the design of this 
system impacts on the collaborative process. This mediation has 
methodological advantages: the experimenter may have explicit control over 
some aspects of collaboration (e.g., setting rules for turn taking, determining 
the division of labour or distribution of activities). The effects of the computer 
as medium also has pedagogical aspects: to support the type of interactions 
that are expected to promote learning. We describe three settings in which the 
computer influences collaboration.. 
4.1 Two human users collaborate on a computer-based task 
Until relatively recently, one of the main advantages associated with computer 
use in schools was seen in terms of the potential for individualised learning. 
However, since schools generally have more students than computers, 
children often work in groups at the computer. Several empirical results 
suggest that group work — at least dyadic work — at the computer may 
enhance the benefit derived from the collaborative learning situation (for a 
review, see Blaye et al, 1990). The specific questions to be addressed here 
deal with the extent to which learner(s)-computer interaction and human-
human interaction can reciprocally enhance one another. For instance, 
interfaces which induce a specific distribution of roles between learning 
partners help to foster social interaction (O'Malley, 1992; Blaye et al., 1991). 
Such interfaces can serve to scaffold the executive and regulative aspects of 
the collaborative task. Another interesting example concerns the principle of 
immediate feedback which was seen as a critical feature in the first generation 
of educational software. It seems that immediate feedback may prevent 
fruitful exchanges between human co-learners because they then rely on the 
system to test their hypotheses instead of developing arguments to convince 
one another (Fraisse, 1987). In other words, aspects of the software can 
modify the socio-cognitive dynamics between the learning partners. In 
particular, the computerised learning environment constitutes in itself a 
mediational resource which can contribute to create a shared referent between 
the social partners (Roschelle & Teasley, in press).  
This research does not aim to build a ‘theory' of human-human collaboration 
at the computer. The fact that the medium (i.e., the computer) is similar is by 
no means a sufficient reason to unify this field of research. Different 
interfaces, different computer-based tasks and activities may yield very 
different interactions and learning outcomes. However, for the sake of 
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simplicity, we refer generically to computer-based activities in order to 
discuss the other general parameters which exert an influence (e.g., frequency 
of feedback, representations induced by the interface, role distribution, etc.). 
4.2 Computer-mediated collaboration 
While the previous setting was influenced by research in educational 
technology, the setting considered here has developed in parallel with work on 
'computer-supported cooperative work' (CSCW). This discipline covers 
communication systems from simple electronic mail to more advanced 
‘groupware’ (Shrage, 1992). There are various ways in which computers can 
support communication. In the past, this technology has been restricted to 
textual communication, but developments in broad bandwidth technology 
allow for more exciting possibilities such as synchronous shared workspaces 
and two-way audio-visual communication. Generally speaking, broad 
bandwidth is expected to afford greater opportunities for collaboration. This 
does mean that older technologies should be superseded. For instance, 
asynchronous text-based communication provides time for reflection on 
messages and allows students lacking in confidence to learn nevertheless by 
“eavesdropping” on conversations. In addition, low bandwidth 
communication may have some advantage in that, if it takes time and costs 
money in terms of connect time and if displays are restricted to a screen at a 
time, students may be forced to consider their responses more carefully. 
Computer-mediated communication settings enables the experimenter to 
consider the communication bandwidth as factor. For instance, Smith et al. 
(1991) observed that task distribution was easier with a larger bandwidth (i.e., 
when seeing each other via video instead of audio-only communication) and 
when the setting gave users the feeling of being side-by-side, through having 
a shred workspace. They also observed that establishing face-to-face contact 
seems to be important during reflection stages, e.g., when partners discuss 
their observations, hypotheses or strategies. This fits in with research on 
mediated communication which, in general, suggests that face-to-face 
communication is more effective than audio-only communication for tasks 
which involve elements of negotiation (see Short, Williams & Christie, 1976). 
4.3 Human-computer collaborative learning 
Human-computer collaboration refers to situations where the system and the 
human user share roughly the same set of actions. We don't include systems 
which support an asymmetric task distribution, as between a user and a word 
processor, for instance. We describe two types of system where some learning 
is supposed to result from collaborative activities: apprenticeship systems and 
learning environments. Most of these systems do not actually fully satisfy the 
symmetry criterion. 
An apprenticeship system is an expert system that refines its knowledge base 
by watching a human expert solving problems. The human expert is actually 
more teaching the system than collaborating with him or her, but the 
techniques developed are relevant to collaborative learning. The expert's 
behaviour is recorded as an example and the system applies explanation-based 
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learning (EBL) techniques to learn from this example. In ODISSEUS 
(Wilkins, 1988), the system attempts to explain each human action in order to 
improve the HERACLES-NEOMYCIN knowledge base. An explanation is a 
sequence of metarules that relate the observed action to the problem-solving 
goal. If ODISSEUS fails to produce the explanation, it tries to "repair" its 
knowledge base by relaxing the constraints on the explanation process. LEAP 
(Mitchell et al., 1990) applies a similar approach to the design of VLSI 
circuits. The user can reject the proposed solution and refine the circuit him or 
herself. In this case, LEAP attempts to create rules that relate a given problem 
description to the circuit specified by the expert-user. LEAP explains why the 
circuit works for the given input signal and then generalises the explanation to 
create the rule premises. The interesting aspect is that these systems attempt to 
acquire the metaknowledge used by an expert, a central issue in the 
Vygotskian approach. However these systems rely on EBL techniques which 
requires a complete theory of the domain. Human learners theories are rarely 
complete and consistent. Some research has been carried out to by-pass this 
problem by integrating EBL with analogical and inductive learning (Tecuci 
and Kodratoff, 1990). 
Not surprisingly, the idea of human-computer collaborative learning has also 
been applied to educational software. It has firstly been suggested as an 
alternative technique for student modelling (Self, 1986), then as an attempt to 
break the computer omniscience that dominates educational computing 
(Dillenbourg, 1992). An interesting issue concerns the necessity to have a 
plausible co-learner. Along the continuum of design choices, we can 
discriminate levels of 'sensitivity'. At the first level, we could imagine an 
ELIZA-like system which randomly asks questions in order to involve the 
learner in plausible collaborative activities. Second level systems include a 
co-worker, i.e., an agent which solves problems during the interaction but 
which is not learning. For instance, the Integration Kid (Chan & Baskin, 
1988) does not learn, but jumps (an the tutor's request) to the next pre-
specified knowledge level. At the third level, we have a real co-learner, i.e., a 
learning algorithm whose outputs are determined by its activities with the 
world, including its interactions with the human learner (Dillenbourg & Self, 
1992). This research has not yet produced enough empirical data to determine 
whether more sensitive systems are more efficient than less sensitive one. 
Another interesting issue to be addressed here is that the phenomena observed 
in human-human collaboration are repeated in human-computer collaboration. 
Salomon (1990) raises an important point in terms of knowing whether 
human-computer interaction has potential for internalisation similar to human-
human conversations. He suggests (Salomon, 1988) that some graphic 
representations could have this potential. We observed (Dillenbourg, in press) 
that learners were not very 'tolerant' with the computer: firstly, they had 
difficulties in accepting that the computerised partner makes silly mistakes, 
then, when the computer was repeatedly wrong, they stopped making 
suggestions altogether. The advantage of human-computer collaborative 
systems for the study of collaboration is that the experimenter can tune several 
parameters regarding to the pair composition (for instance, the initial 
knowledge of the co-partner).  
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5 Tools for analysing interactions 
At the present state of research, it is not clear which theoretical perspective is 
most fruitful for analysing interactions, although incidence of socio-cognitive 
conflict appears to be limited and restricted largely to Piagetian tasks (Blaye, 
1988). However, other researchers have shown that there are benefits in 
generating discussions of conflicting hypotheses for domains such as physics 
(e.g., Howe et al., 19??). A number of researchers (e.g., Webb, Ender & Lewis 
1986; Blaye, Light, Joiner & Sheldon 1991; Behrend & Resnick 1989) have 
shown that various interactive measures other than "conflict" have a positive 
correlation with learning outcomes. It may be, as Mandl & Renkl (1992) 
suggest, that this uncertainty in the field is due to the fact that the Piagetian 
and Vygotskian perspectives as they stand are simply too global to allow 
proper explanation of the different results. These authors thus argue that 
"more local", domain/task-specific theories should be developed. As Barbieri 
& Light (1992) point out, "[s]tudies in collaborative learning at the computer 
usually do not go into a detailed analysis of interaction …" (p. 200), despite 
the fact that it is "… important to analyse the quality of the interaction more 
closely." (p. 200). 
5.1 Analysis categories 
Most researchers have generally used quite global categories of analysis 
grouped according to (at least) the following 'oppositions' : (1) social / 
cognitive, (2) cognitive / metacognitive, and (3) task / communicative . We 
briefly discuss each in turn. 
With respect to the social/cognitive distinction, for example, Nastasi & 
Clements (1992) distinguish "social conflict" (i.e., not related to the problem, 
such as "name calling", "criticism", etc.) from "cognitive conflict" (which 
concerns the task conceptualisation or solution). Only the latter was expected 
to (and did in fact) have a positive correlation with individual improvement. 
In terms of the cognitive/metacognitive distinction, Artzt and Armour-Thomas 
(1992) coded "episodes" such as reading, as cognitive, and understanding, 
planning and analysing as metacognitive. Several types of episodes such as 
"exploring" and "verifying" solutions were categorised as cognitive and 
metacognitive. The working hypothesis was that "the most successful groups, 
in terms of both solving the problem and getting active involvement of all the 
group members, should be those with the highest percentages of 
metacognitive behaviors" (Artzt & Armour-Thomas, 1992, p. 165).  
The third discrimination is between task and communicative levels. The 
communicative level is when the students are trying to achieve a shared 
understanding by establishing common referents, by giving "commentaries" 
whilst performing actions, for example (Barbieri & Light, 1992). Task-level 
analysis categories include "negotiation" (Barbieri & Light, op. cit.), or more 
generally "task construction". As with the cognitive/metacognitive distinction, 
many analysis categories combine both communicative and (extra-
communicative) task aspects, which is not surprising since the objective is to 
study their interrelation. For example, Webb, Ender and Lewis (1986) used 
analysis categories that combined simple speech act types (e.g., question, 
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inform) with parts of the task decomposition (e.g., knowledge of commands, 
syntax, etc. in computer programming). In fact, whilst there may exist 
utterances in dialogue that are purely concerned with managing the interaction 
(such as managing turn-taking, requesting an utterance to be repeated, etc.), in 
task-oriented dialogues, most utterances concerning the task also have a 
communicative dimension — making a relevant contribution to the task 
communicates to the other that you have understood and are sharing a 
common focus. 
To summarise, researchers distinguish management of communicational and 
social relations from performance of cognitive and metacognitive aspects of 
the extra-communicative task. Within these two broad categories, different 
forms of conflict are identified. There is, however, a more fundamental 
analytical problem to be solved: if individual cognitive progress is associated 
with cooperation or collaboration in the interaction, then we need to identify 
when students are in fact cooperating or collaborating, and when they are not 
really addressing each other (such as "problem-solving in parallel"). This 
brings us back to the issue raised in the introduction concerning the 
theoretical distinction between cooperation and collaboration. But, the 
question now is: how do we know when students are truly collaborating? 
Which kind of interactions can be identified as collaborative? In order to 
address this question, Roschelle and colleagues introduced the notion of a 
"Joint Problem Space" [JPS], consisting of jointly agreed goals, methods and 
solutions. At the level of social interaction, in order to determine what is in 
fact "shared" or "mutually accepted", it was necessary to determine when a 
"Yes" signalled 'genuine' agreement and when it merely indicated "turn 
taking" ("I can hear you, go on …", etc.). This latter problem has been 
extensively studied in linguistics within a general model for linguistic 
feedback (Allwood, Nivre & Ahlsén 1991; Bunt 1989). Thus, the meaning of 
"yes" in a given dialogue context depends on the preceding speech act 
(answering "yes" to a yes/no question is different from responding "yes" to a 
statement) and the polarity of the utterance (answering "yes" to "It is raining" 
may signal acceptance, whereas "yes" after "It isn't raining" can mean "oh yes 
it is !" or "yes, I agree that it isn't raining"). More generally, utterances like 
"yes", "no", "ok" and "mhm" give feedback at the level of perception ("I can 
hear you"), comprehension ("I can hear and understand you") and 
agreement/disagreement ("I hear you, understand, and agree"). (The first two 
of these are generally referred to as “backchannel” responses which serve to 
facilitate turn-taking.) Deciding on the meaning of these expressions in a 
given dialogue context is thus quite complex, but necessary if we are to 
understand when students are really collaborating and co-constructing 
problem solutions. At present this line of research on the pragmatics of 
communication remains to be exploited in the field of collaborative learning. 
5.2 Conversation models 
A promising possibility for collaborative learning research therefore is to 
exploit selective branches of linguistics research on models of conversation, 
discourse or dialogue to provide a more principled theoretical framework for 
analysis. Two types of interaction have been universally referred to in 
collaborative learning research : negotiation, often referred to within the 
Vygotskian "cooperation" approach as an indicator of joint involvement in 
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task solutions, and argumentation , as a possible means for resolving socio-
cognitive conflict. In the remainder of this section we review some research in 
language sciences and AI which may be relevant to analysing these 
interactional phenomena in cooperative problem-solving dialogues. 
5.2.1 Negotiation 
In the context of joint problem-solving, we can view negotiation as a process 
by which students attempt (more or less overtly or consciously) to attain 
agreement on aspects of the task domain (how to represent the problem, what 
sub-problem to consider, what methods to use, common referents, etc.), and 
on certain aspects of the interaction itself (who will do and say what and 
when). In DAI, "communication protocols" based on negotiation between 
artificial agents have been developed for resolving resource allocation 
conflicts (Bond & Gasser, 1988; Rosenschien, 1992). Two main negotiation 
strategies may be used : (1) mutual adjustment, or refinement of the positions 
of each agent, and (2) competitive argumentation (Sycara 1988,1989), where 
one agent attempts to convince the other to adopt his proposition. This 
illustrates the fact that quite specific conditions are necessary in order for 
negotiation to be used as a strategy: the agents must be able and willing to 
relax their individual constraints, and the task must possess the required 
'latitude' (if the answer is as clear and determinate as "2+2=4", there is no 
space for negotiation) (Adler et al, 1988). Baker (forthcoming) describes the 
speech acts and strategies used in collaborative learning dialogues, where a 
third strategy (other than refinement and argumentation) is "stand pat" — one 
agent elicits a proposal from the other, using the second agent as a "resource". 
In other words, we can see at least three different types of negotiation 
behaviours, where each may be hypothesised to give different learning 
outcomes: (1) co-constructing problem solutions by mutual refinement, (2) 
exploring different opposed alternatives in argumentation, and (3) one student 
using the other as a resource.  
There is, however, another type of negotiation that is common to any verbal 
interaction, and which takes place at the communicative, rather than the task, 
level: negotiation of meaning. The general idea is that the meaning of 
utterances in verbal interaction (or at least, the aspect of meaning that plays a 
determining role) is not something that is fixed by speakers and their 
utterances, but is rather something to be jointly constructed throughout the 
interaction by both speakers. This continuous process of adjustment of 
meaning will be a major determinant of what will be internalised at an 
individual level. Edmondson (1981) refers to this as "strategic indeterminacy", 
meaning that negotiation of meaning is not a 'defect' of interaction, but is 
rather constitutive of it to the extent that specific interactive mechanisms exist 
that allow mutual understanding to emerge. Thus Moeschler (1985) states that 
"Without negotiation the dialogue is transformed into monologue, the function 
of the interlocutor being reduced to that of a simple receptor of the message." 
(Moeschler, 1985, p. 176). For example, if one speaker (S1) makes the 
utterance "the mass is greater for the red ball", and another (S2) replies "No it 
isn't", S1 can reply with, "no, no, I wasn't saying it was, it was just 
wondering", thus negotiating the illocutionary value of the utterance to be a 
question, rather than an affirmation. We can observe this process of 
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negotiation of meaning most clearly in so called "repair sequences" 
(misunderstanding becomes an explicit object of discourse), but it is important 
to note that from the point of view of most linguistics schools concerned with 
conversation, discourse or dialogue, "negotiation" is not a type of isolated 
sequence that may occur in a dialogue, it is a process operating throughout 
any dialogue (Roulet, 1992).  
Attaining shared understanding of meanings of utterances is a necessary 
condition for collaborative activity (one cannot be said to be 'really' 
collaborating, or agreed, if one doesn't understand what one is collaborating or 
agreed about), and as such the collaborative activity determines the degree to 
which 'full' or 'complete' mutual understanding needs to be attained. From a 
cognitive perspective, Clark & Shaefer (1989) have expressed this fact in 
terms of the speakers' adherence to a criterion of "grounding" : "The 
contributor and the partners mutually believe that the partners have 
understood what the contributor meant to a criterion sufficient for current 
purposes" (Clark & Schaefer, ibid., p. 262). Speakers do this by generating 
units of conversation called "contributions". "Contributions" have two phases: 
a presentation phase and an acceptance phase. They are recursive structures in 
that each acceptance is itself a new presentation, which the hearer is invited to 
consider. In acceptance phases, speakers provide evidence of continued 
understanding, to a greater or lesser degree. The recursion terminates when 
evidence has been provided of the weakest form sufficient for current 
purposes at a given level of embedding. Types of evidence provided are 
conditional on the adjacency pair which constitutes a contribution. They 
include continued attention, initiation of the relevant next contribution, 
acknowledgement (feedback or backchannels such as nods, or utterances such 
as "uh-huh", "yeah", etc.), demonstration (hearer demonstrates all or part of 
what he has understood A to mean), and display (hearer displays verbatim all 
or part of speaker's presentation). Contributions may be generated in one of a 
number of contribution patterns, such as "contributions by turns", by 
"episodes" (corresponding to the "stand pat" negotiation strategy, described 
above), and by collaborative completion of utterances. The latter pattern is an 
indicator par excellence of collaboration in verbal interactions. 
Krauss and Fussell (1991) observed that, during social grounding, the 
expressions used to refer to objects tend to be progressively abbreviated 
(provided that the partner confirms his or her understanding in the 
abbreviation process). Interestingly, the same phenomena of abbreviation is 
observed during internalisation (Kozulin, 1990; Wertsch, 1979, 1991), i.e., as 
the difference between social and inner speech. This difference is due to the 
fact that "inner speech is just the ultimate point in the continuum of 
communicative conditions judged by the degree of 'intimacy' between the 
addresser and addressee" (Kozulin, 1990, p. 178). These similarities between 
social grounding and internalisation fit with the 'distributed cognition' view 
that questions the arbitrary boundary between the social and the individual. As 
thinking is described as a language with oneself (Piaget, 1928; Vygotsky, 
1978), internalisation may be the process of grounding symbols with oneself. 
We can ask whether similar grounding mechanisms also occur in human-
computer collaboration. Some experiments with MEMOLAB (Dillenbourg et 
al., 1993) revealed mechanisms of human-computer grounding: the learner 
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perceives how the system understands him and reacts in order to correct 
eventual misdiagnosis. Even in DAI, authors start to emphasise the need for 
each agent to model each other (Bird, 1993) and exchange self-descriptions 
(Gasser, 1991). 
Turning finally to argumentation, we noted above that it is one of the 
strategies which may be used in collaborative interactions. As such, the way 
in which conflict or disagreement may be resolved in an ensuing 
argumentation phase may be strongly influenced by the context of the higher 
level goal of achieving agreement. For example, students often take the “least 
line of resistance" in argumentation, shifting focus to some minor point on 
which they have agreed, and thus never "really" resolving the conflict (Baker 
1991). This may be related to the following question posed by Mevarech and 
Light (1992, p. 276): "Is conflict itself sufficient as an "active ingredient", or 
is it the co-constructed resolution of such conflict which is effective ?". It 
therefore seems clear that detailed analysis of argumentations in collaborative 
dialogues may help to give finer-grained indications for explaining some 
experimental results. At present, little research has been done on this (but see 
Trognon & Retornaz, 1990; Resnick et al, 1991), and a vast literature on 
argumentation in language sciences remains to be exploited (this is not the 
place to review such a literature, but see for example Toulmin, 1958; Barth & 
Krabbe, 1982; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984; Voss et al., 1986; Miller, 
1987). 
6. Synthesis 
Collaboration is not simply a treatment which has positive effects on 
participants. Collaboration is a social structure in which two or more people 
interact with each other and, in some circumstances, some types of interaction 
occur that have a positive effect. The conclusion of this chapter could 
therefore be that we should stop using the word 'collaboration' in general and 
start referring only to precise categories of interactions. The work of Webb, 
reported above, showed that even categories such as 'explanation' are too large 
to be related to learning outcomes. We have to study and understand the 
mechanisms of negotiation to a much greater depth than we have so far. 
We do not claim that conversational processes are exclusive candidates for 
explaining the effects observed. The 'mere presence' of a partner can, in itself, 
be responsible for individual progress. Neither should we discard the role of 
non-verbal communication in collaboration. However, verbal interactions 
probably provide, at present, more tractable ways in which to tackle the 
development of computational models of collaborative learning. 
In various areas of cognitive science psychologists and computer scientists 
have developed computational models together. This is not the case for 
collaborative learning. We hope that this chapter will help psychologists and 
researchers in machine learning to develop models of collaborative learning. 
Both in psychology and in computer science, individual learning and verbal 
interactions have been studied separately. The challenge is to build a model 
for how the two interrelate, for how dialogue is used as a means for carrying 
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out joint problem-solving and how engaging in various interactions may 
change the beliefs of the agents involved. 
References 
 
Adler, M.R., Alvah, B.D., Weihmayer, R. & Worrest, W. (1988). Conflict-
resolution strategies for nonhierarchical distributed agents. In 
Distributed Artificial Intelligence : Volume II, 139-161. London : 
Pitman Publishing.  
Allwood, J., Nivre, J. & Ahlsén, E. (1991). On the semantics and pragmatics 
of linguistic feedback. Gothenburg Papers in Theoretical Linguistics, 
64, October 1991. 
Artzt, A.F. & Armour-Thomas, E. (1992). Development of a Cognitive-
Metacognitive Framework for Protocol Analysis of Mathematical 
Problem Solving in Small Groups. Cognition and Instruction , 9, (2), 
137-175. 
Azmitia, M. (1988) Peer interaction and problem solving: When are two 
heads better than one? Child Development, 59, 87–96. 
Baker, M.J. (1991). The Influence of Dialogue Processes on the Generation of 
Students' Collaborative Explanations for Simple Physical Phenomena. 
Proceedings of the International Conference on the Learning Sciences, 
. Evanston Illinois, USA, August 1991, pp. 9-19. 
Baker, M.J. (to appear). A Model for Negotiation in Teaching-Learning 
Dialogues. To appear in Journal of Artificial Intelligence in Education. 
Barbieri, M.S. & Light, P.H. (1992). Interaction, gender, and performance on 
a computer-based problem solving task. Learning and Instruction , 2, 
199-213. 
Barth, E.M. & Krabbe, E.C.W. (1982). From Axiom to Dialogue : A 
philosophical study of logics and argumentation. Berlin : Walter de 
Gruyter. 
Behrend, S. & Resnick, L.D. (1989). Peer collaboration in a causal 
reasoning computer task. Golem 1 (12), 2-4. 
Behrend, S., Singer, J. & Roschelle, J. (1988). A methodology for the analysis 
of collaborative learning in a physics microworld. Proceedings of ITS-
88, '8-53. Montréal, June 1-3. 
Bird, S.D. (1993) Toward a taxonomy of multi-agents systems. International 
Journal of Man-Machine Studies, 39, 689-704. 
Blaye, A. (1988) Confrontation socio-cognitive et résolution de problèmes. 
Doctoral dissertation, Centre de Recherche en Psychologie Cognitive, 
Université de Provence, 13261 Aix-en-Provence, France. 
Blaye, A. , & Light, P. (1990). Computer-based learning: The social 
dimensions. In H.C. Foot, M.J. Morgan, & R.H. Shute (Eds.) Children 
helping children. Chichester: J. Wiley & sons. (pp. 135-150). 
Blaye, A., & Chambres, P. (1991). Hypercard as a psychological research 
tool-Experimental studies. In A. Oliveira (Ed.) Hypermedia couseware: 
structures of communication and intelligent help. Berlin: Springer-
Verlag. 
Blaye, A., Light, P.H., Joiner, R. & Sheldon, S. (1991). Joint planning and 
problem solving on a computer-based task. British Journal of 
Developmental Psychology, 9, 471-483. 
  23 
Bond, A.H. & Gasser, L. (1988). Readings in Distributed Artificial 
Intelligence. San Mateo, Calif. : Morgan Kaufmann. 
Brown, A.L., & Palincsar, A.S. (1989). Guided cooperative learning and 
individual knowledge acquisition. In L.B. Resnick (Ed). Knowling, 
learning and instruction, essays in honor of Robert Glaser. Hillsdale, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Publisher. 
Bunt, H.C. (1989). Information dialogues as communicative action in relation 
to partner modelling and information processing. In  N.M. Taylor, F. 
Néel, & D.G. Bouwhuis, The Structure of Multimodal Dialogue, North-
Holland : Elsevier Sciences Publishers. 
Butterworth, G. (1982) A brief account of the conflict between the individual 
& the social in models of cognitive growth. In G. Butterworth & P. 
Light (Eds) Social Cognition (pp. 3-16). Brighton, Sussex: Harvester 
Press. 
Chan, T.-W. & Baskin, A.B. (1988) "Studying with the prince", The computer 
as a learning companion. Proceedings of the International Conference 
on Intelligent Tutoring Systems  (pp.194-200), June 1-3.  Montreal, 
Canada.  
Chi, M.T.H., Bassok, M., Lewis, M.W., Reinman, P., & Glaser, R. (1989). 
Self-explanations: how students study and use examples in learning to 
solve problems. Cognitive Science, 13, 145-182. 
Clark, H.H. & Schaeffer, E.F. (1989). Contributing to Discourse. Cognitive 
Science ,13, 259-294. 
Colbourn, C.J. & Light, P.H. (+987) Social interaction and learning using 
micro-PROLOG. Journal of Computer-Assisted Learning, 3, 130-140. 
Damon, W. (1984) Peer education: The untapped potential. Journal of 
Applied Developmental Psychology, 5, 331–343. 
Dillenbourg, P. (1992) Human-Computer Collaborative Learning. Doctoral 
dissertation. Department of Computing. University of Lancaster, 
Lancaster LA14YR, UK. 
Dillenbourg P. (in press) Distributing cognition over brains and machines. In 
S. Vosniadou, E. De Corte, B. Glaser & H. Mandl (Eds), International 
Perspectives on the Psychological Foundations of Technology-Based 
Learning Environments. Hamburg: Springer-Verlag. 
Dillenbourg, P., & Self, J.A. (1992) A computational approach to socially 
distributed cognition. European Journal of Psychology of Education, 3 
(4), 353-372. 
Dillenbourg, P., Hilario, M., Mendelsohn, P., Schneider, D., & Borcic, B. 
(1993) The Memolab Project. Research Report. TECFA Document. 
TECFA, University of Geneva. 
Doise, W. & Mugny, W. (1984) The Social Development of the Intellect. 
Oxford: Pergamon Press. 
Doise, W. (1990). The development of individual competencies through 
social interaction. In H.C. Foot, M.J. Morgan, & R.H. Shute (Eds.) 
Children helping children. Chichester: J. Wiley & sons. (pp. 43-64). 
Durfee, E.H., Lesser, V.R. & Corkill, D.D. (1989) Cooperative Distributed 
Problem Solving. In A. Barr, P.R. Cohen & E.A. Feigenbaum (Eds) The 
Handbook of Artificial Intelligence (Vol. IV, pp. 83-127). Reading, 
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley. 
Edmondson, W. (1981). Spoken Discourse : A model for analysis. London : 
Longman. 
  24 
Ellis, S. & Rogoff, B. (1982) The strategies and efficacy of child versus adult 
teachers. Child Development, 43, 730–735. 
Fox, B. (1987) Interactional reconstruction in real-time language processing. 
Cognitive Science, 11 (3), 365-387. 
Fraisse, J. (1987). Etude du rôle perturbateur du partenaire dans la découverte 
d'une stratégie cognitive chez des enfants de 11 ans en situation 
d'interaction sociale. Bulletin de Psychologie, 382, 943-952. 
Gasser, L. (1991) Social conceptions of knowledge and action: DAI 
foundations and open systems semantics. Artificial Intelligence, 47, pp. 
107-138. 
Gilly, M. (1989). A propos de la théorie du conflit socio-cognitif et des 
mécanismes psycho-sociaux des constructions: perpectives actuelles et 
modeles explicatifs. In N. Bednarz, & C. Garnier (Eds.) Constructions 
des savoirs: obstacles et conflits. Montréal: Agence d'ARC. 
Glachan, M.D., & Light, P.H. (1981) Peer interaction and teaching: can two 
wrongs make a right? In G. Butterworth & P.H. Light (Eds.) Social 
cognition: studies of the development of understanding. Brighton: 
Harvester Press. 
Howe, C., Tolmie, A., Anderson, A. & Mackenzie, M. (1992). Conceptual 
knowledge in physics : the role of group interaction in computer-
supported teaching. Learning and Instruction , 2, 161-183. 
Hutchins, E. (1991) The Social Organization of Distributed Cognition. In L. 
Resnick, J. Levine and S. Teasley (Eds). Perspectives on Socially 
Shared Cognition (pp. 383 - 307).  Hyattsville, MD: American 
Psychological Association. 
Kozulin, A. (1990) Vygotsky's psychology. A biography of ideas. Harvester, 
Hertfordshire. 
Kuhn, D. (1972) Mechanisms of change in the development of cognitive 
structures. Child development, 43, 833-844. 
Lave J. (1988) Cognition in Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 
Mandl, H. & Renkl, A. (1992). A plea for "more local" theories of 
cooperative learning. Learning and Instruction , 2, 281-285. 
Mevarech, Z.R. & Light, P,H. (1992). Peer-based interaction at the computer : 
looking backward, looking forward. Learning and Instruction , 2, 275-
280. 
Miller, M. (1987). Argumentation and Cognition. In Social and Functional 
Approaches to Language and Thought, pp. 225-249. London : 
Academic Press. 
Mitchell, T.M., Keller, R.M. & Kedar-Cabelli S.T. (1986) Explanation-Based 
Generalization: A Unifying View. Machine Learning, 1 (1), 47-80. 
Moeschler, J. (1985). Argumentation et Conversation : Eléments pour une 
analyse pragmatique du discours. Paris : Crédif-Hatier. 
Mugny, G., Levy, M., & Doise, W. (1978) Conflit socio-cognitif et 
développement cognitif: l'effet de la présentation par un adulte de 
modèles "progressifs" etde modèles "régressifs" dans une épreuve de 
représentation spatiale. Revue Suisse de Psychologie, 37, 22-43. 
Mulryan, C.M. (1992) Student passivity during cooperative small group in 
mathematics. Journal of Educational Research, 85 (5), pp. 261-273. 
Miyake, N. (1986) Constructive Interaction and the Iterative Process of 
Understanding. Cognitive Science, 10, 151-177. 
  25 
Nastasi, B.K. & Clements, D.H. (1992). Social-cognitive behaviors and 
higher-order thinking in educational computer environments. Learning 
and Instruction , 2, 215-238. 
Newman, D., Griffin P., & Cole M. (1989) The construction zone: working 
for cognitive change in school. Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge. 
O'Malley, C. (1987). Understanding Explanation. Cognitive Science 
Research Report No. CSRP-88, University of Sussex (GB). 
O’Malley, C. (1992). Designing computer systems to support peer learning.  
European Journal of Psychology of Education, 7(4), 339-352. 
Palincsar A. (1987) Collaborating for collaborative learning of text 
comprehension. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the 
American Research Association, April. Washington DC. 
Palincsar, A.S. & Brown, A.L. (1984) Reciprocal Teaching of 
Comprehension -Fostering and Comprehension - Monitoring Activities. 
Cognition and Instruction, 1 (2), 117-175. 
Perret-Clermont, A.N., Perret F.-F. & Bell, N. (1991) The social construction 
of meaning and cognitive activity in elementary scool children. In L. 
Resnick, J. Levine & S. Teasley (Eds). Perspectives on Socially Shared 
Cognition (pp. 41-62). Hyattsville, MD: American Psychological 
Association. 
Piaget, J. (1928) The language and thought of the child. New York: Harcourt. 
Piaget, J. (1965). Les études sociologiques. Genève: Droz. 
Radziszewska, B. & Rogoff, B. (1988) Influence of adult and peer 
collaborators on children’s planning skills. Developmental Psychology, 
24, 840–848. 
Resnick, L.B. (1991) Shared cognition: thinking as social practice. In L. 
Resnick, J. Levine & S. Teasley (Eds). Perspectives on Socially Shared 
Cognition (pp. 1-22). Hyattsville, MD: American Psychological 
Association. 
Resnick, L.B., Salmon, M.H. & Zeitz, C.M. (1991). The Structure of 
Reasoning in Conversation. Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual 
Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Hillsdale, New Jersey : 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Riggio, R.E., Fantuzzo, J.W., Connelly, S.C. and Dimeff, L.A: (1991) 
Reciprocal peer tutoring: A classroom strategy for promoting academic 
and social integration in undergraduate students. Journal of Social 
Behaviour and Personality, 6 (2), pp. 387-396. 
Rogoff, B. (1990) Apprenticeship in Thinking: Cognitive Development in 
Social Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rogoff, B. (1991) Social interaction as apprenticeship in thinking: guided 
participation in spatial planning. In L. Resnick, J. Levine & S. Teasley 
(Eds). Perspectives on Socially Shared Cognition (pp. 349-364). 
Hyattsville, MD: American Psychological Association. 
Roschelle, J. (1992) Learning by collaboration: Convergent conceptual 
change. Journal of the Learning Sciences, 2, 235-276. 
Roschelle, J. & Teasley, S. (in press) The construction of shared knowledge 
in collabrative problem solving. In C.E. O'Malley (Ed) Computer-
supported collaborative learning. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. 
Rosenschein, J.S. (1992). Consenting Agents : Negotiation Mechanisms for 
Multi-Agent Systems. Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Joint 
  26 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence [IJCAI-93], 792-799. San Mateo, 
Calif. : Morgan Kaufmann. 
Roulet, E. (1992). On the Structure of Conversation as Negotiation. In H. 
Parret & J. Verschueren, J.(Eds) (On) Searle on Conversation, pp. 91-
100.  Amsterdam : John Benjamins.  
Salomon, G. & Globerson, T. (1989) When teams do not function the way 
they ought to. International journal of Educational research, 13 (1), 89-
100. 
Salomon, G. (1988) AI in reverse: computer tools that turn cognitive. Journal 
of educational computing research, 4, 12-140. 
Salomon, G. (1990) Cognitive effects with and of computer technology. 
Communication research, 17 (1), 26-44. 
Schrage, M. (1990) Shared Minds. The new technologies of collaboration. 
New York: Random House, 1990. 
Self, J.A. (1986) The application of machine learning to student modelling. 
Instructional Science, 14, 327-338. 
Slavin, R.E: (1983) Cooperative learning. New York: Longman. 
Suchman, L.A. (1987) Plans and Situated Actions. The problem of human-
machine communication. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sycara, K. (1988). Resolving Goal Conflicts via Negotiation. Proceedings of 
the AAAI-88 Conference, St. Paul Minnesota (USA), 245-250. 
Sycara, K. (1989). Multiagent Compromise via Negotiation. In L. Gasser & 
M.N. Huhns (Eds), Distributed Artificial Intelligence : Volume II, , pp. 
119-137. London : Pitman Publishing. 
Tecuci, G. & Kodratoff, Y. (1990) Apprenticeship learning in imperfect 
domain theories. In Y. Kodratoff and R.S. Michalski (Eds). Machine 
Learning. (Vol. III, pp. 514 - 551). Palo Alto, CA: Morgan Kaufmann. 
Tomasello, M., Kruger, A.C. & Ratner, H.H. (1993) Cultural learning. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16, 495-552. 
Toulmin, S. (1958). The Uses of Argument. Cambridge : Cambridge 
University Press. 
Trognon, A. & Retornaz, A. (1990). Opposition des points de vue et solution 
du problème des quatre cartes. Verbum XIII (1-2), pp. 39-55. 
Trowbridge, D. (1987) An investigation of groups working at the computer. 
In K. Berge, K. Pezdec, & W. Banks (Eds) Applications of cognitive 
psychology: Problem solving, Education and Computing. Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 
Tudge, J. & Rogoff, B. (1989) Peer influences on cognitive development: 
Piagetian and Vygotskian perspectives. In M. Bornstein & J. Bruner 
(Eds.) Interaction in Human Development. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Van Eemeren, F.H. & Grootendorst, R. (1984). Speech Acts in Argumentative 
Discussions. Dordrecht-Holland : Foris Publications. 
VanLehn K. & Jones R.M. (1993) Learning by explaining examples to onself: 
A computational model. In S. Chipman & A.L. Meyrowitz (Eds) 
Foundations of knowledge acquisition: cognitive model of complex 
learning. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Verba, M. & Winnykamen, F. (1992) Expert-novice interactions: Influence of 
power status. European Journal of Psychology of Education, 6, 61–71. 
  27 
Voss, J.F., Blais, J. & Means, M.L. (1986). Informal reasoning and subject 
matter knowledge in the solving of economics problems by naive and 
novice individuals. Cognition and Instruction, 3(4), 269-302. 
Vygotsky, L.S. (1962) Thought and Language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Vygotsky, L.S. (1978) Mind in Society: The Development of Higher 
Psychological Processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Webb, N.M. (1991) Task related verbal interaction and mathematics learning 
in small groups. Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, 22 
(5), 366-389. 
Webb, N.M., Ender, P. & Lewis, S. (1986). Problem-Solving Strategies and 
Group Processes in Small Groups Learning Computer Programming. 
American Educational Research Journal, 23 (2), 243-261. 
Wertsch, J. V. (1979) The regulation of human action and the given-new 
organization of private speech. In G. Zivin (Ed.), The development of 
self-regulation through private speech, 79-98. New York: John Wiley 
& Sons. 
Wertsch, J.V. (1985) Adult-Child Interaction as a Source of Self-Regulation 
in Children. In S.R. Yussen (Ed.), The growth of reflection in Children 
(69-97). Madison, Wisconsin: Academic Press.  
Wertsch, J.V. (1991) A socio-cultural approach to socially shared cognition. 
In L. Resnick, J. Levine & S. Teasley (Eds). Perspectives on Socially 
Shared Cognition (pp. 85 - 100). Hyattsville, MD: American 
Psychological Association. 
Wilkins, D.C. (1988) Apprenticeship learning techniques for Knowledge 
Based Systems. Doctoral Dissertation. Report STAN-CS-88-142. 
Stanford University, CA. 
Wood, D., Wood, H., Ainsworth, S. & O’Malley, C. (in press) On becoming a 
tutor: Towards an ontogenetic model. Cognition & Instruction. 
 
